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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK GRANATO, 
Plaintiff -Appell ant, 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GRAND JURY, e t a l . , 
Defendants -Respondents. 
Case No. 14425 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On the 12th day of December, 1975, in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the appellant filed an amended com-
plaint for a writ of habeas corpus against the respondents alleging the 
illegality of his constructive restraint which followed an indictment 
against him which was returned by the respondents on the 26th day of 
August, 1975. 
The appellant contends his constructive restraint is in viola 
tion of due process and equal protection afforded him in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and 
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Article I, Sections 7, 12, 24, and 27 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, because: 
1. The indictment was issued without 
probable cause, 
2. The appellant was denied verbatim 
copies of transcripts of the testimony of all wit-
nesses who appeared before the respondents 
relative to the indictment. 
3 . The appellant was denied the names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons 
interviewed relative to the indictment to deter-
mine both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. 
4. The appellant was denied taking depo -
sitions before trial on the indictment. 
5. The appellant was denied a preliminary 
examination before trial on the indictment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable Elrnest F . 
Baldwin, Jr. , Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granted the respondents1 motion to dismiss the appellant's amended 
complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's dismissal 
of the appellant's amended complaint and a writ of habeas corpus order-
ing the appellant released from constructive restraint relative to the 
indictment. 
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In the alternative the appellant seeks this court to: 
1. Remand this matter to the lower 
court to have a hearing on the merits relative 
to the sufficiency of probable cause relative 
to the indictment. 
2. Order that the appellant be furnished 
verbatim copies of transcripts of the testimony 
of all witnesses who appeared before the respon-
dents relative to the indictment. 
3 . Order that the appellant be furnished 
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
of all persons interviewed relative to the indict-
ment to determine both inculpatory and exculpa-
tory evidence. 
4. Order that the appellant be permitted 
to take depositions before trial on the indictment. 
5 . Order that the appellant be given a 
preliminary examination before trial on the 
indictment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(Relating to Indictment) 
On the 26th day of August, 1975, in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, respondents filed a four-count felony 
indictment, Criminal No. 28220, against the appellant in his official 
executive capacity of being Chairman of the Salt Lake County Planning 
and Zoning Commission. 
Count I alleges that on or about the 23rd day of May, 1973, 
the appellant asked for a bribe from George Jones . . . . 
Count II alleges that on or about the 23rd day of May, 1973, 
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the appellant received a bribe from George Jones . . . . 
Count III alleges that on or about the 8th day of August, 
1973, the appellant solicited a bribe from George Jones . . . . 
Count IV alleges that on or about the 8th day of August, 
1973, the appellant accepted a bribe from George Jones . . . . 
Seeking to challenge the sufficiency of probable cause and to 
adequately prepare in the event of trial for the indictment in Criminal 
No. 28220 in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
appellant on the 20th day of November, 1976, filed motions requesting: 
1. Verbatim copies of transcripts of 
testimony of all witnesses who appeared before 
the grand jury relative to the indictment. 
2. The names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers of all persons interviewed by 
the grand jury to determine both inculpatory 
and exculpatory evidence. 
3 . Depositions be taken by the appellant 
of all persons deemed necessary for adequate 
preparation of his defense to the indictment. 
4 • A preliminary examination be 
afforded the appellant before trial on the 
indictment. 
On the 25th day of November, 1975, the Honorable Ernest F . 
Baldwin, Jr . , Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, heard arguments of the above motions filed by the appellant in 
Criminal No. 28220 and ruled from the bench that: 
1. The appellant's motion to be 
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furnished verbatim copies of transcripts of 
all witnesses who appeared before the grand 
jury relative to the indictment be granted. 
2. The appellant's motion requesting 
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
of all persons interviewed by the grand jury to 
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence was granted in part and denied in part. 
Judge Baldwin granted that the appellant be 
furnished the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of all witnesses whom the State would 
call at trial on the indictment. Judge Baldwin 
denied that the appellant be furnished the 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 
any persons interviewed by the grand jury to 
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence whom the State would not call at trial 
on the indictment. 
3 . The appellant's motion to take 
depositions of all persons deemed necessary 
for adequate preparation of his defense to the 
indictment be denied. 
4. The appellant's motion to be 
afforded a preliminary examination before trial 
on the indictment be denied. 
On the 3rd day of December, 1975, Judge Baldwin amended 
his order of November 25, 1975, which granted the appellant's motion 
to be furnished verbatim copies of transcripts of all witnesses who 
appeared before the grand jury relative to the indictment. His amended 
order of December 3, 1975, denied the appellant verbatim copies of 
transcripts of testimony of any witnesses who appeared before the 
grand jury relative to the indictment. It granted the appellant reading 
inspection only of transcripts of testimony of the three witnesses named 
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on the indictment who appeared before the grand jury. And it denied 
the appellant to take any verbatim notes from his reading inspection of 
the transcripts of testimony of the three witnesses named on the indict-
ment who appeared before the grand jury. 
All three witnesses named on the indictment were documented 
accomplices, granted immunity, and are without corroboration to estab-
lish probable cause for the indictment. 
On or about the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable 
Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr . , Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, ordered that the trial on the indictment, Criminal No. 
28220, against the appellant be stayed until this appeal is decided. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(Relating to Habeas Corpus) 
Subsequent to the orders made on the 25th day of November, 
1975, relative to the indictment, Criminal No. 28220, by the Honorable 
Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr . , Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the appellant filed in the same court on the same day a 
civil complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, Civil No. 231867, alleging 
the illegality of his constructive restraint in Criminal No. 28220 because 
there was insufficient probable cause for the indictment. 
On the 12th day of December, 1975, the appellant filed an 
amended complaint in Civil No. 231867 alleging the illegality of his 
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constructive restraint in violation of the due process and equal protec-
tion provisions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitu-
tion of the United States because: 
1. The indictment in Criminal No. 
28220 against the appellant was issued without 
sufficient probable cause. 
2. The appellant was denied verbatim 
copies of transcripts of testimony of any and 
all witnesses who appeared before the grand 
jury relative to the indictment. 
3 . The appellant was denied the 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 
all persons interviewed by the grand jury to 
determine both inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence. 
4. The appellant was denied taking 
depositions of all persons deemed necessary 
for adequate preparation of his defense to the 
indictment. 
5 . The appellant was denied a 
preliminary examination before trial on the 
indictment. 
On the 15th day of December, 1975, the Honorable Ernest F . 
Baldwin, Jr . , Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant's com-
plaint and amended complaint in Civil No. 231867 and on the 26th day of 
January, 1976, ordered in writing that both the appellant's complaint and 
amended complaint be dismissed for their failure to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted. 
- 7 -
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That written order of the lower court is the subject of this 
appeal to this court . 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF 
COULD BE GRANTED. 
Habeas corpus is civil in nature*- and provided for by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.^ 
Rule 65B(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Special forms of pleadings and of 
writs in habeas corpus . . . are 
hereby abolished. Where no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules, 
on any one of the grounds set forth 
in subdivision (b) and (f) of this ru le . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 65B(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Habeas Corpus. Appropriate relief 
by habeas corpus proceedings shall 
be granted whenever it appears to 
the proper court that any person is 
unjustly imprisoned or otherwise 
restrained of his l iberty. If the 
1
 • Home v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268. 
2 . Rule 65B (f), Utah R. Civ. P . ; Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 
388 P.2d 412. 
o 
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person seeking relief is imprisoned 
in the penitentiary and asserts that 
in the proceedings which resulted in 
his conviction there was a substantial 
denial of his rights under the Consti-
tution of the United States or under 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
or both, then the person seeking such 
relief shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 65 B (i). In all other cases, 
proceedings under this subdivision 
shall be conducted in accordance with 
the following provisions: 
(1) The complaint seeking 
relief shall, among other things, state 
that the person designated is illegally 
restrained of his liberty by the defen-
dant . . . the cause or pretense (of 
the restraint) . . . annexing a copy of 
any legal process . . . that the 
legality of the . . . restraint has not 
already been adjudged upon a prior 
proceeding; whether another complaint 
for the same relief has been filed and 
relief thereunder has been denied by 
any court . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 65B (f)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited 
above, is consistent with the requirements of Form 17, Complaint 
Seeking Writ of Habeas Coipus, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
was followed substantially in the preparation of appellant's complaint 
and amended complaint which were dismissed by the lower court for 
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and 
_o_ 
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plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
and (2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or 
of several different types may be 
demanded. 
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint which were 
dismissed by the lower court for failure to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted also met the requirements of Rule 8(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited above. 
Rule 8(e) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Each averment of a pleading shall be 
simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions 
are required. 
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint which the 
lower court dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could 
be granted also met the requirements of Rule 8(e) (1), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as cited above. 
Rule 8 (e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
A party may also state as many claims 
. . . as he has regardless of consistency 
and whether based on legal or equitable 
grounds or on both. 
The appellant's complaint and amended complaint also met the 
requirements of Rule 8(e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited 
above. 
i n . 
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In fact, the appellant challenges the respondents to cite any 
requirement within the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which the appel -
lantTs complaint and amended complaint did not meet, although they 
were dismissed by the lower court for failure to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted. 
Even though it is in the nature of a writ of error, habeas 
corpus is not to be used simply for appellate review of error .3 Instead, 
habeas corpus is a collateral^ challenge of jurisdiction. ^  
Habeas corpus was brought in the instant case to challenge 
jurisdiction. Both the respondents and the lower court recognized this 
purpose, and neither made issue to the contrary in pleadings nor hear-
ings. Therefore, this court should not concern itself with the propriety 
of the nature of relief sought, because this case should be reviewed as 
presented and decided by the trial court." 
The only issue to be decided by this court relative to this 
numbered point is whether the trial court procedurally properly dis-
missed the appellant's complaint and amended complaint for failing to 
3 . Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121. 
4. Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 68 L. Ed. 1070, 44 S. Ct. 525. 
5 . Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121; § 2225, 5 Whartonfs 
Criminal Law and Procedure 455-458, and the many cases cited 
thereunder. 
6. Robert A. Crist and Jack L. Williams, dba Oak Hill School v. 
Mapelton City and Paul Cherrington, Utah 1972, 497 P.2d 633. 
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state a claim for which relief could be granted. 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
the respondents were within their rights to file a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. However, 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that such 
motion should be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of 
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable oppor-
tunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that there 
can be no summary judgment rendered unless there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. 
There exists in the instant case a genuine issue as to a 
material fact, i .e . , whether there was probable cause for the respon-
dents to return the indictment. The only manner in which the lower 
court could have determined probable cause would have been to have had 
an adversary hearing wherein both court and counsel could have reviewed 
and been heard on the contents of the transcripts of the witnesses named 
in the indictment as those on whose testimony the indictment was 
returned. 
The lower court did not review the transcripts of the grand 
jury witnesses (T. 11) • The lower court denied the appellant's motion 
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for verbatim transcripts of the grand jury witnesses. And the lower 
court refused to rule on the issue of probable cause, which was the 
genuine issue present concerning a very material fact which should have 
prevented the respondents from being entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The respondents were not entitled to a judgment of dismissal 
as a matter of law because habeas corpus is the proper procedure to 
follow in challenging the trial court's jurisdiction for lack of probable 
cause for the return of an indictment. ^  
The respondents argued: 
I don't believe statutorily that this 
Court or any Court should review the 
indictment of the Grand Jury to deter-
mine whether or not the Grand Jury 
rightfully or properly had probable 
cause to issue the indictment (Tr. 3). 
Yet, Utah Code Annotated § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1975) states that 
the grand jury must receive none but legal evidence, and the best evi-
dence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence. 
How can the propriety of the grand jury indictment be determined if 
there can be no judicial review? And how can there be a proper judicial 
review if the appellant be denied the due process of law right to notice 
7. Shelby v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 82 Nev. 204, 414 P.2d 942; 
Ivey v. State, 82 Nev. 427, 420 P.2d 853; Franklin v. State, 
Nev. 1973, 513 P.2d 1252. 
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and be heard rather than summarily have his alleged genuine issue 
ignored? 
Furthermore, how can the appellant have equal protection of 
the law when counsel for the respondents have verbatim transcripts of 
grand jury testimony to determine probable cause, but he cannot? 
The lower court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to criminal 
trial with the appellant until probable cause has been determined by 
judicial hearing to exist for the return of the indictment. 
The lower court's order of dismissal for failure to state a 
claim for which relief could be granted should be reversed. This 
matter should be remanded to the lower court for an adversary hearing 
to determine if probable cause existed to warrant the return of the 
indictment. 
Point II 
APPELLANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENIED 
VERBATIM COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL 
GRAND JURY WITNESSES • 
In addition to the need for transcripts of testimony of grand 
jury witnesses to challenge probable cause for the return of the indict-
ment, as discussed in more detail in Point I, there exist further needs 
to meet the constitutional rights of the appellant. 
For example, article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides, inter alia, that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
1 A _ 
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have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to be confronted by witnesses against him, 
and to appeal. 
It should be carefully noted that our constitution refers to 
prosecutions, not just trials, when it states these and other rights of an 
accused. And our constitution does not limit its terms to a complaint, 
an information, nor an indictment when it states that an accused has the 
right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and 
to have a copy thereof. 
To assume propriety relative to the grand jurors and the 
prosecutors, it must be further assumed that witnesses who testified 
before the grand jury at the request of the prosecutors must have made 
accusations against the appellant to cause the return of the indictment. 
Therefore, the appellant has the right to have verbatim copies of the 
transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the 
grand jury if he indeed is to be afforded his constitutional right to have 
a copy of the nature and cause of the accusation against him0 
Also, the same reasoning would compel that the appellant 
has the right to have verbatim copies of the transcripts of the testi-
mony of all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury if he indeed 
is to be afforded his constitutional right to be confronted by the wit-
nesses against him. 
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Furthermore, the same reasoning would compel that the 
appellant has the right to have verbatim copies of the transcripts of the 
testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury if he 
indeed is to be afforded his constitutional right to appeal. Without ver-
batim copies of the transcripts of the testimony of all witnesses who 
appeared before the grand jury, how could the appellant challenge or 
appeal an adverse ruling concerning the requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1975) which provide that the grand jury must 
receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the 
exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence? 
This court in the case of State v. Harries" held that the 
accused was entitled to inspect at trial for the purpose of impeachment 
the transcript of testimony of witnesses before the grand jury* 
And this court in the case of State v. Faux^ held that (1) the 
accused was entitled to inspect before trial for the purpose of impeach-
ment the transcript of testimony of witnesses before the grand jury; 
(2) the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; (3) the defense counsel is entitled to use the transcript a reasonable 
time before trial so that he can properly prepare his defense and the 
trial could proceed with efficiency and dispatch; and (4) equal justice 
8. 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605. 
9. 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186. 
1 L. 
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demands that no one's rights or reputation may be invaded or destroyed 
by unidentified informers. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held for various reasons 
that the accused has the right to have copies of the transcripts of the 
testimony of the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury. 10 
Notwithstanding that grand jury proceedings have been kept 
secret for reasons this court stated in State v. Faux*-*-, this court 
therein held that after the indictment is returned and the accused is 
arrested, the reasons for secrecy have been largely spent; and it would 
be unfair not to allow defense counsel to inspect the transcripts before 
trial while one charged by the usual method of filing a complaint is 
entitled to a preliminary hearing which affords him an opportunity to 
know what the witnesses against him testify to; whereas one indicted by 
a grand jury does not have that advantage. 
This court should reverse the lower court's order of dis-
missal of the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand 
this case with an order compelling the lower court to furnish the 
10. Shelby v. Sixth Tudicial District Court, 82 Nev. 204, 414 P.2d 942; 
Ivey v. State, 82 Nev. 427, 420 P.2d 853; Riley v. State, Nev. 
1967, 429 P.2d 59; Franklin v. State, Nev. 1973, 513 P.2d 1252; 
People v. Bellanca, 386 Mich. 708, 194 N.W. 863; Parpliano v. 
District Court, Colo. 1971, 491 P.2d 965; Johnson v. Superior 
Court of San Joaquin County, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 539 P.2d 792; 
State v. Parks, Alaska 1968, 437 P.2d 642; Burkholder v. State, 
Alaska 1971, 491 P.2d 754. 
11. 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186. 
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appellant verbatim copies of the transcripts of the testimony of all wit-
nesses who appeared before the grand jury. Otherwise, the appellant 
would be denied due process and equal protection afforded him by the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Point III 
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE 
APPELLANT A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE STATE OF UTAH . 
Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
provides: 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State, or by indictment, 
with or without such examination and 
commitment. (Emphasis added.) 
This court has repeatedly held that an accused charged by 
information has a right to have a preliminary examination before t r i a l . ^ 
12. State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P.2d 1091; State v. Hale, 
Utah , 263 P. 86; State v. Jensen, 36 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085; 
State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 1000; State v. Pay, 45 Utah 
411, 146 P. 300; State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P. 306; 
State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860. 
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However, by dictuml3 and habit only, so far as can be ascertained by 
the appellant, the courts of the State of Utah have held that an accused 
charged by indictment does not have the right to have a preliminary 
examination before trial. 
Yet, the Constitution of the State of Utah*"* clearly expresses 
Tf
 . . , by indictment, with or without such examination . . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
We must look to our dictionaries and English books to find the 
meaning of the material words of our constitution which provide for 
preliminary examinations and indictments. 
The word frsuchtf within the phrase "with or without such 
examination" is used as an adjective modifying the noun "examination" 
to describe what kind or which one, ^ specifically being the same as 
what was stated before. 1° Therefore, the phrase "with or without such 
examination" as used in our constitution-^ following the word "indict-
ment" must be construed to mean the same kind of an examination as 
stated before relative to informations. That is, every accused charged 
13. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186. 
14. Utah Const, art I, § 13. 
15. Warriner's English Grammar and Composition, § 1 c, p . 8; 
Harbrace Handbook of English, Revised Edition, § 4 a, p . 67. 
16. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, 
p . 2518; Webster's New World Dictionary of the American 
Language, College Edition, p . 1456. 
17. Utah Const, art . I, § 13. 
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by information or indictment has the right to have a preliminary exami-
nation before trial unless the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of the 
phrase following the word "indictment" which states "with or without 
such examination"? There would surely be a denial of equal protection 
if one accused charged by indictment had the right to have such examina-
tion (with), and another accused charged by indictment was denied the 
right to have such examination (without). 
And there would surely be a denial of equal protection if the 
prosecutor were to be able to charge one accused by information, afford-
ing him with the right to such examination before trial; and to be able to 
have charged another accused by indictment of the very same offense, 
denying him the right to such examination before trial . 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States occurs when a state arbitrarily 
grants or denies procedural protections to persons similarly si tuated.^ 
The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, relying on its 
inherent powers to regulate the criminal process, held that any accused, 
whether he be charged by information or indictment, has the fundamental 
18. Humphrey v. Cody, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972); Baxtram v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
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right to a preliminary examination before t r i a l . ^ 
The Supreme Court of the State of California has stated: 
Until the accused is given the right to 
demand a post indictment preliminary 
hearing there is no question but that 
he is being denied due process at a 
critical stage of the proceedings, and 
also that there is a violation of equal 
protection when rights accorded an 
indicted defendant are compared with 
those of an individual whose prosecu-
tion is initiated by information .20 
(Emphasis added.) 
This court should overrule the lower court's order dismissing 
the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand this matter 
with an order compelling the lower court to afford the appellant his right 
to have a preliminary examination before trial. 
Point IV 
THE LOWER COURT1 S ORDER DENYING THE 
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS 
AS REQUESTED VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
This court has unanimously held in an opinion written by 
Justice Crockett that it was error for an accused charged by indictment 
19. People v. Duncan, 338 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972). 
20. Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 
539 P.2d 792 (1973), concurring opinion, Justice Mosk, concurred 
in by Chief Justice Wright, and not dissented to by Justice Tobriner, 
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to be denied the right to take depositions before t r ia l .21 However, 
four qf the justices, including Justice Crockett, held such e r ro r not to 
be prejudicial because the defendant did not claim that he would have 
obtained any additional information from the depositions. Nor did he 
argue their value for impeachment or cross-examination. The fifth 
justice, Justice Henriod, dissenting, but only in that he believed it was 
prejudicial to deny the accused the right or privilege either of taking 
depositions of witnesses or having a preliminary hearing, stated: 
The main opinion points out correctly 
that the accused had access to informa-
tion obtained by the Grand Jury, ^
 and 
was furnished answers by the district 
attorney to interrogatories put to him. 
But it loses sight of the fact that such 
information was not the product of 
sworn testimony elicited by questions 
put by counsel of the accused's choice. 
It seems to lose sight also, of the fact 
that preliminary hearings and the right 
to take depositions frequently are the 
sharpest weapons available to counsel 
in piercing subsequent testimony by 
confrontation with prior inconsistent 
testimony. Such an opportunity, denial 
of which appellant assigned as e r ro r , 
quite frequently resul ts in impeachment 
that may make the difference between 
guilt or innocence in the minds of the 
veniremen. 
2 . State v. Faux, District Judges of the 
Third District, 1959, 9 Utah 2d 
350, 345 P.2d 186. (Emphasis 
added.) 
2 1 . State v . Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12. 
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Surprisingly, without any reference to its unanimous opinion 
to the contrary, as expressed in the Geurtz case, 22
 t hi s court later and 
most recently held in a 3-2 opinion written by Justice Tuckett that it was 
not error for an accused charged by complaint to be denied the right to 
take depositions before trial, except when a material witness for the 
defendant is about to leave the state or is so ill or infirm as to afford 
reasonable grounds for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the 
trial . 23 
Chief Justice Callister and Justice Henriod concurred in the 
Nielsen case^4 without either writing a separate opinion. Therefore, 
we are not given the benefit of their reasons for their apparently incon-
sistent respective opinions in the Geurtz25
 ancj Nielsen2^ cases. 
Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented in the Nielsen 
case27 with each writing a separate opinion. Justice Crockett is consis-
tent in his opinions in the Geurtz2° and Nielsen2^ cases, and Justice 
Ellett has never rendered an opinion that is inconsistent with his opinion 
in the Nielsen case. 
22. State v. Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12. 
23. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
24. Id. 
25. Supra, n. 22. 
26. Supra, n. 23. 
27. Supra, n. 23. 
28. Supra, n. 22, 
29. Supra, n. 23. 
30. Supra, n. 23. 
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Chief Justice Callister is no longer on the bench. He was 
very recently replaced by now Justice Maughan, who was then counsel 
for the defendant-appellant in the Nielsen case, 31 wherein he advocated 
that the accused charged by complaint had the same right to take depo-
sitions in criminal cases as in civil cases. 
It should reasonably be anticipated that this court as presently 
constructed should overrule the Nielsen case.^2 And that is precisely 
what the appellant here seeks. There is no need nor basis to distinguish 
it. And there is no reason nor excuse to ignore it. 
Four of the five justices of this present court (Chief Justice 
Henriod, Justice Crockett, Justice Ellett, and Justice Maughan) have at 
different times opined that an accused charged with a crime or malfea-
sance in office has the same right to take depositions in criminal cases 
as in civil cases. 
The time is long past due to correct this inequality of justice 
that presently exists in this state between the right of a defendant in a 
civil case to take depositions and the denial of a defendant in a criminal 
case to take depositions for the same purposes. If the right to take 
depositions is afforded a defendant in a civil case, where he stands to 
lose only his dollars and cents, surely that same right should be afforded 
31. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
32. Id. 
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a defendant in a criminal case, where he stands to lose his life or 
liberty.' 
This issue should be resolved now in favor of the appellant's 
right to take depositions before trial in his criminal case. And it should 
be so resolved whether initiated by seeking a declaration, as was done 
in the Nielsen case;*3 or by a habeas corpus complaint, as was done in 
this case; or by any other form which in substance presents the same 
issue. Also, it should be resolved whether an accused is charged with a 
crime by complaint, information, or indictment; or whether an accused 
is charged with malfeasance in office by a complaint, information, or 
indictment. 
As Chief Justice Henriod stated in his dissenting opinion in the 
Geurtz case, ^ where he believed it was prejudicial error to deny the 
accused the right or privilege either of taking depositions of witnesses or 
of having a preliminary hearing: 
Such queasy quasi reasoning seems 
hardly befitting our historical and 
traditional insistence that an accused 
be possessed of reasonably adequate 
defensive tools, including representa-
tion by counsel, so as properly to 
present his side in the fairest possible 
manner. 
This court should overrule the Nielsen case^S for at least 
33. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
34. State v. Geurtz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12. 
35. Supra, n. 33. 
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five reasons. 
1. It held that the taking of depositions in criminal cases 
is governed by two statutes, 3 6 which apply only when a witness is about 
to leave the state or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds 
for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the trial . However, it 
failed to hold or even mention that the taking of depositions in criminal 
cases is also governed by two other statutes, ^ as Justice Crockett noted 
in his dissent, which apply only when a witness resides out of the state. 
2. The Nielsen c a s e ^ held that neither statutes nor rules 
of civil procedure providing for discovery or the inspection of evidence 
in the possession of an adverse party will be made applicable to criminal 
cases, citing cases all of which were decided before Rule 81 (e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by order of this court January 20, 
1974, which states: 
These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal pro -
ceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, 
that any rule so applied does not 
conflict with any statutory or consti-
tutional requirement. 
For the reasons that both Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett 
point out in their respective dissents in the Nielsen case, 39 there is no 
36. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953). 
37. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-47-1, 2 (1953). 
38. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
39. W. 
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conflict between Rule 81 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
statutes4^ cited by the majority. 
3 . The Nielsen case 4 1 held that Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides that any party may take the testimony 
of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination, 
is so broad in scope that its application to criminal cases would present 
grave constitutional problems. For example, an attempt to take the 
deposition of a defendant would violate his right against self-incrimination 
and his right to remain silent. 
Of course, quite simply, that reasoning is without merit, 
because as Justice Crockett further points out in his same dissent, MNo 
one supposes that any procedural rule could deprive a person of his 
constitutional rights; and Rule 81(e) clearly so indicates/' It is funda-
mental that even during a deposition in a civil case, a witness has the 
right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent on that 
constitutional ground. 
4. The Nielsen case4^ held that until the statutes cited4^ 
are modified or repealed by the legislature, this court would be without 
power to provide for discovery proceedings by court rule. 
40. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953). 
41 . State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
42. W. 
43. Supra, n. 40. 
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This reasoning is also without merit, because it fails to 
recognize the statutory authority44 and the inherent power45 this court 
has to make, modify, or repeal rules of procedure, such as Rule 25 of 
the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure prepared by the National 
Commissioners on Uniform Laws — and hopefully a similar rule to be 
proposed by this court's present Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure — providing for depositions in criminal cases the 
same as in civil cases. 
If this court is presently without statutory authority or inherent 
power to make, modify, or repeal rules of judicial procedure — and 
must therein submit to legislative control — then there exists a very 
serious violation of constitutional separation of powers, and surely no 
purpose to justify the existence of this very court's present Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
5 . If the statutes cited4" are as restrictive as the majority 
held them to be in the Nielsen case , 4 7 and this court is without statutory 
authority or inherent power and therefore fails to provide for depositions 
in criminal cases the same as in civil cases, then an accused charged 
with a crime or malfeasance in office will be denied due process and 
44. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1953). 
45. People v. Duncan, 338 Mich. 489, 201 N.W. 2d 629 (1972); Ex parte 
Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911). 
46. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1, 2 (1953). 
47. State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P.2d 1366. 
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equal protection of the law in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
This court should reverse the lower court's order of dis-
missal of the appellant's complaint and amended complaint and remand 
this matter to the lower court with the order that the appellant be 
granted the right to take depositions as requested before his criminal 
trial so that he may use such depositions for discovery, cross-examina-
tion, impeachment, confrontation, or any other purpose afforded a party 
in a civil case. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process and equal protection of the law are synonymous 
with the fundamental principle of what is fair for one is fair for all who 
are similarly situated. 
One charged with a crime or malfeasance in office, be he 
charged by complaint, information, or indictment, should be afforded 
the very same rights as another so charged by any of the other initial 
documents. 
Therefore, if one is charged by complaint or information and 
afforded the right to challenge probable cause before a magistrate, one 
charged by indictment likewise should be furnished a grand jury tran-
script to challenge probable cause. 
Also, if one is charged by complaint or information and 
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afforded a preliminary examination to be confronted by his accusers, 
the right to cross-examine, and to compel the attendance of a witness 
on his behalf, one charged by indictment likewise should be afforded a 
preliminary examination for the same purposes. 
Furthermore, if a defendant in a civil case is afforded the 
right to take depositions for discovery, impeachment, confrontation, 
cross-examination, and other uses, a defendant in a criminal case like-
wise should be afforded the same right. And, especially, if the prose-
cutor in a criminal case has the right to take depositions, ^ due process 
and equal protection of the law surely dictate that defense counsel like-
wise should be afforded the very same right. 
All points of this appeal are of the utmost importance in deter-
mining the jurisdiction of the lower court to proceed with the criminal 
trial of the appellant and therefore should be decided by this court prior 
thereto. 
It is the sincere position of the appellant that this court should 
reverse the lower court's order dismissing the appellant's complaint and 
amended complaint and remand this matter with orders granting the 
appellant verbatim copies of the grand jury transcripts, an adversary 
hearing to challenge probable cause based on the testimony in such tran-
scripts, a preliminary examination, and the right to take depositions as 
48. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-45-1 to -21 (1953). 
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requested — all before any criminal trial on the indictment. 
For this court to do otherwise would deprive the appellant of 
his constitutional rights more specifically described in this brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
and D. FRANK WILKINS 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By 
Phil L. Hansen 
•i Arfrs^mrft. 
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